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The  inflation  of  the  past  ten  years  has  been  a 
lvorldwide  phenomenon.  Accordingly,  analysts 
have  become  increasingly  aware  that  any  satis- 
factory  explanation  of  price  level  behavior  must 
account  for  its  international  character.  These  ana- 
lysts  fall  into  three  main  schools.  First  are  the 
eclectics,  who  attribute  world  inflation  to  a  complex 
and  ever-changing  mixture  of  causes,  e.g.,  the 
exercise  of  monopoly  power  by  oil-producing  na- 
tions  ;  the  international  conjuncture  of  cyclical 
booms;  and  the  occurrence  of  bad  harvests,  poor 
fish  catches,  and  other  autonomous  reductions  in 
the  supplies  of  key  commodities.  Second  are  the 
members  of  the  cost-push  school,  who  blame  inflation 
on  worldwide  labor  militancy.  Third  are  the  global 
uYtonetarists,  who,  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  other 
schools,  focus  largely  or  exclusively  on  the  mone- 
tary  factor. 
The  theoretical  basis  of  this  third  approach  is 
the  monetary  theory  of  the  balance  of  payments. 
As  usually  presented,  this  theory  assumes  that 
the  countries  of  the  world  are  linked  together  (as 
they  actually  were  until  1973)  by  fixed  eschange 
rates  between  freely  convertible  currencies.  The 
sum  total  of  these  currencies  converted  into  a 
common  unit  at  the  fixed  exchange  rate  consti- 
tutes  the  world  money  stock.  This  stock,  in  con- 
junction  with  the  demand  for  it,  determines  the 
world  price  level,  which  is  then  transmitted  to 
individual  countries  by  commodity  arbitrage,  the 
operation  of  which  tends  to  equalize  prices  in  all 
markets.  Finally,  by  importing  or  exporting 
money  in  eschange  for  goods  and  securities,  each 
nation  uses  the  mechanism  of  the  balance  of 
payments  to  bring  its  domestic  money  stock  into 
line  with  the  exact  quantity  required  to  support 
the  price  level.  \Vhen  applied  to  the  interpreta- 
tion  of  recent  inflationary  experience-at  least  up 
to  1973  when  fixed  rates  were  widely  abandoned 
for  flexible  ones-this  theory  implies  that  exces- 
sive  world  monetary  expansion  generated  the  in- 
fIation,  that  commodity  arbitrage  propagated  it, 
and  that  the  balance  of  payments  mechanism 
distributed  the  world  money  supply  as  requirecl 
to  accommodate  or  validate  it  in  each  natioll. 
This  articie  seeks  to  explain  the  foregoing 
theory  and  i:s  public  policy  implications  with  the 
aid  of  a  simple  expository  model  of  the  interna- 
tional  monetary  mechanism.  Although  originally 
constructed  ior  the  specific  purpose  of  analyzing 
the  economic  effects  of  a  currency  devaluation, 
the  model  is  easily  adaptable  to  the  monetarist 
esplanation  of  world  inf1ation.l  In  fact,  it  con- 
stitutes  an  almost  ideal  framework  within  which 
to  articulate  the  global  monetarist  view  because 
it  embodies  most  of  the  elements  essential  to  that 
view.  These  elements  are  outlined  in  the  follow- 
ing  section,  which  serves  as  a  necessary  prelimi- 
nary  to  the  description  of  the  model  and  its  com- 
ponents. 
Monetarist  Propositions  Any  analytical  model 
that  conveys  the  essence  of  the  global  monetarist 
explanation  of  world  inflation  must  contain  cer- 
tain  key  ingredients  that  characterize  that  ap- 
proach.  These  elements  include  the  following: 
1.  THE  VIEW  OF  THE  WORLD  AS  THE 
RELEVANT  CLOSED  ECONOMY.  The  global 
monetarist  views  the  world  as  a  closed  system  of 
interdependent  open  national  economies  connected 
by fixed  or  imperfectly  floating  exchange  rates.  In 
this view,  nations  are  interpreted  as regions  of  the 
closed world  economy,  and problems  of  inflation  in 
any  particular  nation  are  treated  as  purely  re- 
gional  phenomena,  as  are  questions  relating  to  an 
individual  nation’s  distributive  share  of  the  world 
money  stock. 
2.  THE  QUANTITY  THEORY  OF  MONEY.  The 
quantity  theory  constitutes  the  second  key  compo- 
nent of  the  global  monetarist  view.  The  quantity 
theory  states that  the path of  world  prices  in long- 
run  equilibrium  is  completely  determined  by  the 
path  of  the  world  money  stock.  This  conclusion 
follows  from  the theory  of  the  interaction  between 
the  demand  for  real  (price-deflated)  money  bal- 
ances and the nominal  stock of  money.  The demand 
for  real  balances  is  interpreted  as  a stable  mathe- 
matical  function  of  a few  macroeconomic  variables, 
the most important  being  real income  and an inter- 
’  The  model  is  presented  by  Dornbuseh  in  [31.  See  Mundell  [4. 
Chapter  S:  5,  Chapters  9,  10,  11,  12.  151  for  an  earlier  and  6ome- 
what  different  trezrment  of  the  main  elements  of  the  model.  The 
most  complete  description  of  the  Dornbusch  model  appears  in 
Whitman  [il.  who  uses  it  to  explain  the  global  monetarist  approach 
to  the  balance  of  payments.  Swoboda  [61  and  Claassen  [21  emplov 
the  Dornbusch  model  to  analvze  world  inflation  under  fixed  and 
flexible  exchange  rates,  respectively.  Also  see  Branson  Cl]  for  a 
similar  approach.  The  present  article  follows  Whitman  and  Swoboda 
ClOSdY. 
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of  holding  money.  Given  the values  of  these inde- 
pendent variables,  the  theory  states  that  the  price 
level  will  adjust  to  bring  the  real  volume  of  any 
nominal  stock  of  money  into  equality  with  the 
amount  demanded.  From  this it follows  that if  the 
income  and  interest  rate  determinants  of  the  de- 
mand  for  money  are  given.  an  exogenously  given 
nominal  stock  of  money  completely  determines  the 
price  level.  Xore  generally,  in  terms  of  a growing 
world  economy,  the  long-run  rate  of  world  mone- 
tary  expansion  determines  the  steady-state  rate  of 
world  inflation,  given  the  trend  growth  rate  of 
world  output.  Two  important  implications  of  the 
quantity  theory  should be noted at this point.  The 
first  is  that  money  has  no  influence  on  real  eco- 
nomic  variables  in  the  long  run.  The  second  is 
that  in  long-run  equilibrium  the  price  level  will 
vary  in exactly  the  same  proportion  as  the money 
stock.  Known  as  the  neutrality  and  equipropor- 
tionality  postulates,  respectively,  these two proposi- 
tions must  be embodied  in any  mathematical  model 
that  purports  to  represent  the logical  structure  of 
the  global  monetarist  view. 
3.  LAW  OF  ONE  PRICE.  From  the  universally 
accepted  pxoposition  that  commodity  arbitrage 
tends  to  equalize  prices  of  identical  traded  goods 
across  countries-due  allowance  of  course  being 
made  for  tariffs  and  transportation  costs-mone- 
tarists  move directly  to the proposition  that general 
price  levels  also tend  to  be equalized.  Monetarists 
note that in a world  of  rigidly  fixed  exchange  rates 
between  freely  convertible  currencies  money  itself 
becomes  a  homogeneous  traded  good  whose  price, 
like that of  any other traded  good, will  be equalized 
internationalIy.  But  since  the  domestic  price  of 
money  in  terms  of  goods  is  simply  the  inverse  of 
the general  price  level,  it  follows  that  equalization 
of  the  price  of  money  implies  equalization  of  na- 
tional  price  levels.  This  point,  incidentally,  distin- 
guishes modern  global  monetarists  from  their  clas- 
sical  counterparts  of  the  18th  and  19th  centuries, 
notably  David  Hume and David  Ricardo.  The latter 
group  argued  that  the  volume  of  imports  and 
exports  depends  on  domestic  prices  reIative  to 
foreign  prices  and  that  changes  in  these  relative 
prices  constitute  a key link in the automatic  specie- 
flow  mechanism  that  operates  to  correct  payments 
imbalances  and  to  maintain  the  equilibrium  inter- 
national  distribution  of  the  precious  metals.  Xod- 
ern  monetarists  deemphasize  such  relative  price 
effects  on the grounds  (1)  that  efficient  arbitrage 
prevents  price  disparities  from  developing  except 
for  the briefest  of  intervals  and  (2)  that  the auto- 
matic  adjustment  process  operates  mainly  through 
divergences  between income and expenditure  rather 
than through  the classical  relative  price  mechanism. 
4.  MONETARY  IXTERPRETATIOK  OF  THE 
BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS.  The  fourth  key 
component  of  the  monetarist  approach  is  the  con- 
cept  of  the  balance  of  payments  as  the  means  by 
which  open  economies  adjust  their  existing  stocks 
of  money  to the stocks  they desire  to hold.  Suppose 
a country’s  actual  money  stock  is  smaller  than  the 
stock  its  residents  desire  to  hold.  Endeavoring  to 
replenish  their  cash  balances,  these  residents  wiIl 
cut  their  expenditure  thereby  releasing  resources 
for  the export  trade.  The  country  will  run a trade 
balance  surplus,  exporting  goods  and  importing 
money  until  the  gap  between  actual  and  desired 
money  stocks  is  eliminated.  Conversely,  if  the 
existing  stock  of  money  is  greater  than  that  de- 
sired,  national  expenditure  will  exceed  national 
output  and  the  country  will  run  a  trade  balance 
deficit,  importing  goods  and exporting  money  until 
the excess  money  balances  are  worked  off.  In this 
manner,  each  nation  will  use  its  balance  of  pay- 
ments  to  attain  monetary  equilibrium,  and  for  the 
world  as  a  whole,  the  balance  of  payments  mecha- 
nism  will  distribute  the  world  money  stock  across 
nations  consistent  with  monetary  equilibrium  in 
each  nation.  The  key  assumption  underlying  the 
foregoing  view  is  that,  in  the  long  run  at  least, 
national  central  banks  do  not  use  open  market 
operations  and  other  policy  weapons  to  offset  or 
neutralize  (“sterilize”)  the  impact  of  external 
money flows  on the behavior  of  the domestic  money 
stock.  One justification  for  this assumption  is that 
the  effect  of  sterilization  operations  wouId  be  to 
create  international  interest  rate  differentials  that 
would  induce  capital  flows  sufficient  to  undermine 
the sterilization  policy.  Finally,  it  should  be noted 
that  the  nonsterilization  assumption  means  that 
from  the point  of  view  of  an individual  country  the 
money supply  is an endogenous  variable  completely 
determined  by  the  public’s  decisions  to  acquire  or 
get  rid  of  cash  through  the  balance  of  payments. 
Here  the  traditional  monetarist  assumption  of  an 
exogenous  money  stock  applies  only  to  the  closed 
world  economy  and not  to individual  open  nationa 
economies. 
Constituting  the  essential  ingredients  of  the 
monetarist  theory  of  world  inflation,  these  four 
elements  are  incorporated  in  the  analytical  model 
presented  below. 
The  Model  and  Its  Components  The  model  itself 
consists  of  a  hypothetical  two-country  world 
economy  represented  by  a  set  of  equations  con- 
taining  the  following  variables.  Let  D  be  the 
desired  stock  of  national  nominal  money  balances 
and  M  the  actual  stock  composed  of  a  domestic 
credit  component  C  and  an  international  reserve 
component  R.  Furthermore,  let  &f  and  R  be  the 
rates  of  change  (time  derivatives)  of  the  national 
money  stock  and  its  foreign  exchange  reserve 
component,  respectively,  and  A  be  an  adjustment 
coefficient  representing  the  speed  of  adjustment 
of  actual  to  desired  money  stocks.  -41~0,  let  IX 
be  the  desired  ratio  of  nominal  cash  balances  to 
nominal  income,  U  the  level  of  real  output,  P  the 
price  level,  and  X  the  exchange  rate  (domestic 
currency  price  of  a  unit  of  foreign  currency). 
The  cash  balance  ratio  I<  is  treated  as  a  numeri- 
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variables  are  taken  as  exogenously-determined 
givens.  Finally,  let  E  be  nominal  national  ex- 
penditure  and  B  the  trade  balance  measured  in 
domestic  currency.  For  simplicity,  the  trade 
balance  is  identified  with  the  overall  balance  of 
payments,  i.e.,  the  capital  account  and  interna- 
tional  capital  flows  are  ignored.  Unstarred  vari- 
ables  refer  to  the  home  country,  starred  vari- 
ables  to  the  foreign  country  (i.e.,  rest  of  the 
world),  and  the  subscript  w  to  the  closed  world 
economy.  Percentage  rates  of  change  of  vari- 
ables  are  represented  by  lower-case  letters-for 
example,  p  is  the  percentage  rate  of  change  of  the 
price  level  P. 
Purchasing  Power  Parity  Equation  The  first 
equation  of  the  model  is  the  goods  arbitrage  or 
purchasing  power  parity  equation 
(1)  P  =  xp*, 
which  embodies  the  “law  of  one  price”  proposi- 
tion  that  international  arbitrage  tends  to  equalize 
the  money  price  of  goods  in  terms  of  either  cur- 
rency.  The  equation  states  that  the  price  level  in 
the  home  country  is  equal  to  the  product  of  the 
exchange  rate  and  the  price  level  in  the  foreign 
country,  implying  that  the  price  levels  in  the  two 
countries  are  the  same  when  converted  into  a 
common  unit  at  the  fixed  exchange  rate.  Note 
that  this  equation  corresponds  to  the  global 
monetarist  view  that  national  commodity  markets 
are  merely  parts  of  a  single  unified  world  com- 
modity  market. 
Money  Demand  Equations  The  second  part  of 
the  model  consists  of  demand  for  money  equa- 
tions,  one  for  each  country.  These  equations 
express  the  stock  of  nominal  money  balances  that 
the  public  desires  to  hold  in  the  aggregate  as  a 
constant  fraction  K  of  the  level  of  nominal  na- 
tional  income  (the  product  of  the  price  level  and 
the  exogenously  given  level  of  real  output).  The 
equations  are  written  as  follows: 
(2)  D  =  KPY  and  D*  =  K*P*Y*. 
As  written,  these  demand  functions  comply 
with  the  quantity  theory  of  money  in  at  least 
three  respects.  First,  the  exogeneity  of  the  real 
output  variable  squares  with  the  quantity  the- 
ory’s  assumption  that  output  is  determined  inde- 
pendently  of  the  behavior  of  money  in  the  long 
run.  Second,  the  demand  functions  exhibit  a 
one-to-one  relationship  between  the  quantity  of 
money  demanded  and  the  price  level.  In  the 
technical  jargon  of  monetary  theory,  the  func- 
tions  are  said  to  be  homogeneous  of  degree  one 
in  prices.  This  homogeneity  property  implies 
both  (1)  absence  of  money  illusion  (the  inability 
of  economic  agents  to  distinguish  between  real 
and  nominal  economic  magnitudes)  and  (2)  long- 
run  neutrality  of  money  as  postulated  by  the 
quantity  theory.  It  also  ensures  that  the  theory’s 
equiproportionality  postulate  will  be  satisfied, 
i.e.,  that  the  price  level  will  vary  in  exactly  the 
same  proportion  as  the  money  supply.  Third, 
the  demand  functions  exhibit  the  stability  re- 
quired  by  the  theory,  this  stability  being  assured 
by  the  assumed  constancy  of  the  desired  money/ 
income  ratios. 
Money  Supply  Equations  The  foregoing  demand 
equations  represent  only  one  side  of  the  money 
market  and  must  be  matched  by  supply  equations 
representing  the  other.  These  equations  are  de- 
rived  from  the  consolidated  balance  sheet  of  the 
commercial  banks  and  the  central  bank  of  each 
country.  By  a  simple  accounting  identity,  the 
monetary  liabilities  of  those  sectors  can  be  shown 
to  be  backed  by  an  equivalent  amount  of  assets 
as  indicated  by  the  equations 
(3)  M  =  C  +  R  and  M*  =  C*  +  R*. 
Here  M  is  the  narrowly  defined  money  supply 
(currency  plus  demand  deposits),  C  is  domestic 
credit  defined  as  the  banking  system’s  holdings 
of  net  domestic  assets,  and  R  is  the  banking  sys- 
tem’s  holdings  of  international  reserves.  The 
foregoing  equations  merely  express  national 
money  stocks  as  the  sum  of  their  respective 
source  components,  domestic  and  foreign.  Of 
these  two  components  only  the  first  is  under  the 
control  of  the  monetary  authority.  By  contrast, 
the  foreign  source  component-and  therefore  the 
money  stock  itself-is  determined  by  the  public’s 
demand  for  cash.  If  the  public  is  just  satisfied  to 
hold  the  existing  stock  of  money,  any  policy- 
engineered  change  in  the  domestic  credit  compo- 
nent  will  induce  an  equal  but  opposite  change  in 
the  foreign  source  component,  leaving  the  na- 
tion’s  money  stock  unchanged. 
Corresponding  to  the  national  money  supply 
equations  is  the  equation 
(4)  M,  =  M  +  XM* 
that  defines  the  world  money  stock  M,  as  the 
sum  of  the  national  money  stocks  expressed  in  a 
common  currency  unit.  The  world  money  stock 
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lows  from  the  assumption  that  the  quantity  of 
world  reserves  is  given.  Given  the  latter,  all  the 
components  of  the  world  money  stock,  namely 
the  domestic  source  component  of  the  national 
money  stocks  plus  world  reserves,  are  exogenous 
and  therefore  so  is  the  world  money  stock  itself. 
Note,  however,  that  while  total  world  reserves 
can  be  treated  as  a given,  a  single  nation’s  reserve 
holdings  cannot  be  so  treated,  which  is  the  reason 
national  money  supplies  are  endogenous  variables 
from  the  viewpoint  of  the  national  authorities. 
Despite  their  simplicity,  equations  3  and  4  are 
taken  as  constituting  an  accurate  specification  of 
the  supply  side  of  the  money  market. 
Money  market  equilibrium,  of  course,  requires 
that  money  demand  equal  money  supply  in  each 
nation,  implying  a  zero  excess  demand  for 
money.  Although  this  condition  must  be  satisfied 
in  the  long  run,  it  may  well  be  violated  in  the 
short  run,  in  which  case  national  money  markets 
will  exhibit  temporary  disequihbrium  as  mani- 
fested  by  excess  demands  for  or  supplies  of 
money.  When  monetary  disequilibrium  occurs, 
however,  an  automatic  self-corrective  mechanism 
starts  to  function  as  people  begin  to  adjust  their 
cash  holdings  to  bring  actual  liquidity  back  into 
line  with  desired  liquidity. 
Money  Stock  Adjustment  Equations  The  adjust- 
ment  mechanism  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
paragraph  is  represented  by  the  model’s  fifth  set 
of  equations,  which  state  that  the  rate  at  which 
each  country  augments  or  depletes  its  cash  hold- 
ings  is  proportional  to  the  excess  demand  for 
money-.  These  money  stock  adjustment  equations 
are  written  as  follows: 
(5)  $1  =  A(D--M)  and  $I*  =  A*(D*-$I*), 
where  S$  is  the  change  in  money  holdings  per 
unit  of  time,  D-M  is  escess  demand  for  money 
(the  difference  between  desired  and  actual 
stocks),  and  A  is  an  adjustment  coefficient  ex- 
pressing  the  speed  at  which  money  stocks  are 
adjusted  in  response  to  excess  demand.  The 
cfoser  the  coefficient  is  to  unity  the  faster  the 
adjustment,  and  the  closer  it  is  to  zero  the  slower 
the  adjustment.  In  the  extreme  case  where  the 
coefficient  has  a  numerical  value  of  unity,  adjust- 
ment  is  sufficiently  rapid  to  eliminate  excess 
stock  demand  within  the  same  period  it  occurs. 
In  the  opposite  case,  i.e.,  a  zero  coefficient,  ad- 
justment  never  occurs  and  excess  demand  per- 
sists  indefinitely.  The  model  assumes  that  the 
coefficient  is  large  enough  to  insure  that  full 
stock  adjustment  is  eventually  achieved.  The 
channel  or  mechanism  through  which  monetary 
adjustment  is  accomplished  is,  of  course,  the  bal- 
ance  of  payments. 
Balance  of  Payments  Equation  The  sixth  com- 
ponent  of  the  model  is  the  balance  of  payments 
equation,  which  performs  two  important  func- 
tions.  First,  it  specifies  the  role  of  the  external 
trade  balance  in  the  money  stock  adjustment 
process.  Specifically,  the  equation  states  that  the 
trade  balance  surplus  (the  excess  of  money  re-, 
ceipts  from  sales  abroad  over  monetary  expendi- 
tures  on  purchases  from  abroad)  is  by  definition 
equal  to  the  country’s  net  change  in  international 
reserves  and  therefore,  given  domestic  credit,  in 
the  stock  of  money  itself,  i.e.,  B  =  R  =  1%.  This 
expression  corresponds  to  the  monetary  theory  of 
the  balance  of  payments  according  to  which  a 
nation  adds  to  its  stock  of  money  by  running  :a 
trade  balance  surplus,  exporting  goods  in  ex- 
change  for  money,  and  reduces  its  money  stock 
by  running  a  trade  deficit,  importing  goods  in 
exchange  for  exports  of  money.  The  expression 
also  embodies  the  key  monetarist  assumption  that 
the  policy  authorities  do  not  offset  or  nullify 
(“sterilize”)  the  impact  of  payments  disequilibria 
and  reserve  flows  on  the  domestic  money  supply. 
The  second  purpose  of  the  equation  is  to  insure 
that  the  two-country  model  is  internally  consis- 
tent  by  imposing  the  condition  that,  for  the  world 
as  a  whole,  the  sum  of  the  individual  trade  bal- 
ances  when  measured  in  terms  of  a  common 
monetary  unit  is  identically  equal  to  zero.  This 
condition  means  that  if  the  home  country  is  run- 
ning  a  trade  balance  surplus,  the  foreign  country 
(rest  of  world)  must  be  running  a  trade  defilcit 
of  the  same  amount  when  measured  in  terms  of 
home  country  currency.  Symbolically,  the  bal- 
ance  of  payments  identity  is  B  =  -XB*,  where 
B  is  the  home  country’s  trade  balance  surplus 
and  -XB*  is  the  foreign  country’s  trade  deficit 
(a  negative  surplus)  expressed  in  units  of  do- 
mestic  currency  at  the  fised  exchange  rate.  This 
expression,  showing  how  the  individual  countries 
are  unified  via  the  balance  of  payments  identity, 
constitutes  a  mathematical  statement  of  the 
global  monetarist  view  of  the  world  as  a  closed 
system  of  interdependent  open  economies. 
To  summarize,  the  complete  balance  of  pay- 
ments  equation,  expressing  both  the  zero  world 
trade  balance  identity  and  the  monetary  view  oi 
the  external  accounts,  is  written  as  follows: 
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-xR*. 
Note  that  since  by  definition  the  foreign  coun- 
try’s  trade  deficit  measured  in  terms  of  domestic 
currency  must  equal  the  home  country’s  surplus, 
it  follows  that  the  money  outflow  from  the  for- 
mer  country  must  also  equal  the  money  inflow 
into  the  latter.  Here  is  the  global  monetarist 
view  of  the  balance  of  payments  as  the  allocation 
mechanism  that  distributes  a  given  total  of  world 
money  across  nations. 
Expenditure  Equations  Completing  the  model 
are  the  expenditure  equations  that  describe  the 
connection  between  the  money  market  and  the 
commodity  market.  These  equations  indicate 
that  in  a  world  in  which  the  public  can  hold  only 
money  and/or  goods,  an  excess  demand  for  one 
implies  a  corresponding  excess  supply  of  the 
other  and  vice  versa.  Written  as  follows: 
(7)  E  =  PY  -  ti  and  E*  =  P*Y*  -  M*, 
the  equations  express  a  relationship  between  do- 
mestic  expenditure  E  (i.e.,  spending  by  domestic 
residents  on  both  home-  and  foreign-produced 
goods),  nominal  income  PY,  and  the  rate  of 
accumulation  or  decumulation  of  cash  balances 
i?if. 
According  to  the  equations,  spending  equals 
income  only  when  cash  balances  are  not  being 
augmented  or  depleted,  i.e.,  when  the  public  is 
just  satisfied  to  hold  the  existing  stock  of  money. 
An  excess  supply  or  demand  for  money,  however, 
causes  expenditure  to  deviate  from  income.  For 
example,  an  excess  demand  for  cash  means  that 
commodity  expenditure  falls  short  of  income  as 
the  public  endeavors  to  build  up  its  cash  balance. 
Conversely,  an  excess  supply  of  money  implies 
that  expenditure  exceeds  income  as  the  commu- 
nity  tries  to  get  rid  of  its  excess  cash  holdings. 
Note  also  that  the  equations  imply  a  relationship 
between  spending,  income,  and  the  trade  balance. 
This  corresponds  to  the  monetarist  view  that  the 
international  adjustment  p.rocess  operates  pri- 
marily  through  divergences  between  expenditure 
and  income  rather  than  through  changes  in  the 
relative  prices  of  exports  and  imports.  The  equa- 
tions  imply  that  when  domestic  spending  for 
goods  exceeds  domestic  income  (production),  net 
commodity  imports  will  fill  the  gap  and  the  trade 
balance  will  be  in  deficit.  Similarly,  when  do- 
mestic  expenditure  falls  short  of  production,  the 
unabsorbed  output  will  be  exported,  thereby  re- 
sulting  in  a  trade  surplus.  Only  if  expenditure 
just  equals  production  will  the  trade  balance  be 
zero. 
The  Equations  Summarized  Taken  together,  the 
foregoing  equations  embody  the  main  elements  of 
the  monetarist  view  of  the  world  economy.  The 
equations  link  the  levels  of  prices,  expenditures, 
and  desired  and  actual  money  stocks  in  the  two 
countries  as  well  as  the  flows  of  money  and 
goods  between  them.  To  summarize,  the  equa- 
tions  are  written  as  follows: 
(1)  p  =  xp* 
(2)  D  =  KPY  D*  =  K*P*Y* 
(3)  M  =  C  +  R  M*  =  C*  +  R* 
(4)  M,  =  M  +  XM 
(5)  ti  =  A(D-M)  &I* =  A*(D*-M*) 
(6)  B=-XB*=M=l&---X&l*= 
-xl%* 
(7)  E  =  PY  -  M  E*  =  P*Y*  -  M*. 
Equations  i-4  help  determine  the  equilibrium 
(steady-state)  values  of  the  price  and  monetary 
variables,  while  equations  S-7  describe  the  adjust- 
ment  mechanism  by  which  equilibrium  is  restored 
following  a  monetary  disturbance.  Specifically, 
the  equilibrium  world  price  level  is  determined  by 
equating  the  n-or-Id money  supply  shown  in  equa- 
tion  4  with  the  aggregate  world  real  demand  for 
money  implicit  in  equation  2.  Once  determined, 
the  world  price  level  is  then  transmitted  to  the 
two  countries  via  commodity  arbitrage  as  de- 
scribed  in  equation  1.  The  resulting  country 
price  levels  enter  equation  2  to  determine  nominal 
national  demands  for  money.  If  these  latter  vari- 
ables  differ  from  the  existing  national  money 
stocks  shown  in  equation  3,  the  discrepancy 
enters  equation  5  to  determine  the  rate  of  money 
stock  adjustment,  which  enters  equations  6  and  7 
to  determine  national  expenditures,  trade  bal- 
ances,  and  the  corresponding  international  re- 
distribution  of  the  world  money  stock. 
Less  formaliy,  the  model  implies  the  following 
causal  chain  : 
1.  The  world  stock  of  money  determines  the  world 
price  level. 
2.  International  arbitrage  brings  national  prices 
into  equality  with  world  prices. 
3.  National  price levels  determine  national  nominal 
demands  for  money. 
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national  money  supplies  determine  the  rate  of 
money  stock  adjustment. 
5.  Xoney  stock  adjustment  determines  spending, 
trade  balances,  and  the  direction  and  volume  of 
international  money  flows. 
6.  This  process  continues  until  the  equilibrium 
international  distribution  of  money  is  achieved, 
and  money  market  equilibrium  is  restored  in  each 
country.  At  this  point  the  system  is  said  to  be in 
steady-state  equilibrium. 
Long-Run  Steady-State  Solution  of  the  System 
In  anq’  economic  system,  the  long-run  steady- 
state  is  characterized  by  full  stock  equilibrium, 
i.e.,  a  situation  in  which  existing  asset  stocks  just 
equal  desired  asset  stocks.  In  the  hypothetical 
system  described  by  the  model,  steady-state  equi- 
librium  occurs  when  the  existing  stock  of  money 
(the  sole  asset)  equals  the  desired  stock.  -4s  can 
been  seen  from  equations  5  through  7,  this  in 
turn  implies  that  money  stock  adjustment,  trade 
balances,  and  the  gap  between  expenditure  and 
income  are  all  zero.  In  long-run  equilibrium, 
therefore,  equations  5  through  7  are  irrelevant, 
and  one  can  analyze  the  determination  of  world 
prices  and  their  rate  of  inflation  from  the  first 
four  equations  alone. 
World  Price  Level  and  Inflation  Rate  A  central 
proposition  of  global  monetarism  is  that,  under  a 
regime  of  fixed  exchange  rates,  the  steady-state 
path  of  world  prices  is  determined  by  the  path  of 
the  world  money  stock.  A  version  of  the  quantity 
theory  of  money,  this  proposition  can  be  demon- 
strated  with  the  aid  of  the  four  equations  relevant 
to  the  analysis  of  long-run  equilibrium. 
The  demonstration  requires  several  steps.  First, 
impose  the  condition  of  stock  equilibrium  and  set 
the  supplies  of  money  equal  to  demands,  e.g., 
M  z  KPY.  Second,  use  the  fised  exchange  rate 
to  express  the  money  stock  and  price  variables 
as  world-level  magnitudes.  As  defined  in  equa- 
tion  4:  the  world  money  stock  is  the  sum  of  the 
national  money  stocks  measured  in  terms  of  a 
single  currency,  i.e.,  M,  =  31  +X&l*.  Similarly, 
by  virtue  of  the  purchasing  power  parity  assump- 
tion,  each  nation’s  price  level  espressed  in  terms 
of  a  common  unit  is  equal  to  the  world  price 
level,  i.e.,  P,  =  P  =  XP*.  Note  that  the  assump- 
tion  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  is  absolutely  indis- 
pensable  here  since  it  provides  the  invariable 
common  unit  required  to  convert  national  vari- 
ables  into  a  single  homogeneous  world-level 
measure  that  has  analytical  significance.”  The 
third  step  is  to  recognize  that  by  choice  of  an 
appropriate  unit  of  measurement  for  either  cur- 
rency  the  exchange  rate  can  be  set  equal  to  unity, 
thus  permitting  the  relationship  between  the 
world  money  stock  and  the  world  price  level  to 
be  written  simply  as  3ijI,  =  M  +  M*  =  (KY  -+ 
K”Y*)  P,.  In  long-run  equilibrium,  the  vari- 
ables  enclosed  by  parentheses  are  regarded  as 
exogenously  determined  by  tastes,  technolo,T, 
and  resource  endowments,  and  consequently  are 
taken  as  given.  It  follows,  therefore,  that,  in 
terms  of  the  model,  the  world  price  level  is  fully 
determined  in  the  long  run  by  the  world  money 
stock,  with  changes  in  the  latter  variable  causing 
equiproportionate  changes  in  the  former. 
Corresponding  to  the  preceding  equilibrium 
money-price  relationship  is  the  equilibrium  dis- 
tribution  of  the  world  money  stock.  The  home 
country’s  natural  proportional  share  or  fraction 
S  of  world  money  can  be  espressed  as  S  = 
M/&  =  KY/(KY  +  K*Y*),  and  similarly  for 
the  other  country  (rest  of  world),  whose  share,  of 
course,  is  1-S.  This  important  result  states  that, 
in  steady-state  equilibrium,  the  fraction  of  world 
money  distributed  to  each  nation  depends  upon 
the  relative  importance  of  the  nation’s  demand 
for  real  cash  balances  as  compared  with  the  de- 
mands  of  the  entire  world.  The  demand  for  real 
balances,  of  course,  is  expressed  as  the  product 
of  the  desired  money/income  ratio  and  real  in- 
come.  Assuming  both  countries  have  identical 
money/income  ratios,  the  country  with  the 
greater  real  income  will  command  the  lion’s  share 
of  the  world  money  stock.  As  shown  below,  the 
distributive  share  parameters  S  and  1-S  appear 
in  the  expression  for  the  world  rate  of  inflation, 
the  derivation  of  which  constitutes  the  final  stlep 
of  the  demonstration. 
The  expression  for  the  world  rate  of  inflation 
is  derived  by  taking  the  time  derivative  of  the 
logarithm  of  the  world  money-price  level  rela- 
tionship  and  is  written  as  pW =  m,  -  [Sy  + 
(l-s>yq.3  Here  pm is  the  percentage  rate  of 
.*  . 
tvorld  mZiatlon,  m,  is  the  percentage  rate  of 
growth  of  the  world  money  stock,  y  and  y*  are 
the  exogenously  given  trend  growth  rates  of  real 
output  in  the  two  countries,  and  S  and  1-S  are 
the  shares  of  each  country  in  the  world  money 
2 A  flexible  exchange  rare  implies  two  distinct  national  money  stocks 
and  price  levels  separated  by  a  variable  exchange  rate  relationship 
between  them,  and  therefore  precludes  any  meaninaful  concept  of  a 
single  world  money  stock  and  world  price  Ievel. 
3 Note  that  the  derivation  of  this  formula  requires  that  the  model  be 
reinterpreted  to  allow  for  steady-state  growth  of  the  relevant  vari- 
ables.  Accordin&,  the  equilibrium  mannitudes  of  the  variable3  are 
expressed  not  as  absoiute  dollar  levels  but  rather  as  constant  per- 
centage  rates  of  change. 
18  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1976 stock.  This  equation  states  that  the  rate  of  world 
inflation  is  equal  to  the  difference  between  the 
world  rate  of  monetary  expansion  and  the  growth 
rate  of  world  output  as  measured  by  the  sum  of 
the  weighted  national  output  growth  rates,  the 
weights  being  the  countries’  shares  in  the  world 
money  supply.  In  short,  the  equation  is  an  exact 
statement  of  the  monetarist  conclusion  that  infla- 
tion  results  when  world  monetary  expansion  out- 
paces  world  output  growth. 
The  Dynamic  Adjustment  Process  So  much  for 
the  determination  of  the  path  of  world  prices  in 
steady-state  equilibrium.  The  next  stage  of  the 
analysis  deals  with  the  international  adjustment 
mechanism  as  described  in  equations  5  through  7. 
Regarding  the  adjustment  process,  three  ques- 
tions  are  especially  pertinent.  First,  what  re- 
sponses  are  provoked  by  an  autonomous  increase 
in  the  domestic  money  supply  of  a  single  open 
economy?  Second,  how  do  these  responses  raise 
the  world  price  level. ?  Third,  how  do  individual 
countries  subsequently  adjust  to  the  higher  world 
price  level  ? 
To  answer  these  questions,  start  from  a  hypo- 
thetical  situation  of  worldwide  monetary  equilib- 
rium,  and  let  this  equilibrium  be  disturbed  by  a 
monetary  expansion  in  the  home  country.  Ac- 
cording  to  the  model,  this  disturbance  generates 
an  excess  supply  of  money  leading  to  a  trade  bal- 
ance  deficit  and  an  excess  home  demand  for 
goods  in  the  world  commodity  market,  putting 
upward  pressure  on  world  prices.  The  resulting 
world  price  increase,  disseminated  abroad  via  the 
international  arbitrage  mechanism,  induces  corre- 
sponding  changes  of  opposite  sign  in  the  demand- 
for-money,  stock-adjustment,  expenditure,  and 
trade-balance  equations  of  the  foreign  country.* 
Adjustment  continues  until  both  monetary  re- 
dundancy  in  the  one  country  and  monetary  defi- 
ciency  in  the  other  are  eliminated.  When  equilib- 
rium  is  restored,  world  and  national  price  levels 
will  have  risen  in  proportion  to  the  rise  in  the 
world  money  supply. 
The  preceding  corresponds  closely  to  the  mone- 
tarist  interpretation  of  the  worldwide  inflation  of 
the  late  1960’s  and  early  1970’s.  According  to 
this  view,  excessive  monetary  expansion  in  the 
*The  rise  in  world  prices  also  affects  the  home  country.  reducing 
but  not  eliminating  the  excess  supply  of  money  there.  This  latter 
result  follows  from  the  fact  that  world  prices  rise  in  proportion  to 
the  world,  not  the  national,  money  stock.  Since  the  home  country’s 
stock  is  but  a  fraction  of  the  world  stock,  a  given  percentage  change 
in  the  former  corresponds  to  a  smaller  percentage  change  in  the 
latter.  and  therefore  in  the  world  price  level.  In  short,  world  prices 
will  not  rise  sufficiently  to  eliminate  the  initial  excess  supply  of 
money  in  the  home  country.  The  redundant  money  must  be  gotten 
rid  of  through  the  balance  of  payment& 
U.  S.  generated  a  persistent  excess  demand  for 
goods  and  consequently  a  series  of  balance  of 
payments  deficits  that  pumped  dollars  into  the 
international  monetary  system  in  sufficient  quan- 
tities  to  contribute  significantly  to  global  infla- 
tion.  This  view  departs  from  the  model  only  in 
one  key  respect.  It  contends  that,  because  the 
dollar  itself  constituted  the  primary  international 
reserve  asset,  the  U.  S.  was  able  to  engage  in 
domestic  credit  expansion  that  led  to  the  infla- 
tionary  rise  in  world  liquidity  without  suffering  a 
loss  of  its  own  reserves.  Lacking  an  external 
reserve  constraint,  the  U.  S.,  in  this  view,  became 
a  potentially  potent  source  of  world  inflation. 
Policy  Implications  of  the  Model  The  model 
described  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  contains 
some  radical  implications  for  economic  stabiliza- 
tion  policy.  These  implications  can  be  classified 
according  to  whether  they  pertain  to  small  or  to 
large  open  economies.  Small  economies  are  those 
whose  domestic  policy  actions  can  be  treated  as 
having  a  negligible  impact  on  the  rest  of  the 
world.  Large  economies,  by  contrast,  are  those 
whose  policies  have  a  significant  global  influence. 
In  some  cases-e.g.,  the  United  States-an  econo- 
my  may  be  so  large  as  to  warrant  interpretation 
as  a  closed  economy.  In  what  follows  it  is  also 
well  to  remember  that  the  often  unconventional 
conclusions  derived  from  the  model  reflect  the 
particular  assumptions  underlying  it,  and  that 
many  of  these  assumptions  are  open  to  serious 
criticism.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  assump- 
tions  of  (1)  full  employment,  (2)  perfect  interna- 
tional  arbitrage,  (3)  exogeneity  of  real  income, 
(4)  nonsterilization  of  international  money  flows, 
and  (5)  the  existence  of  an  inherently  stable  self: 
regulating  world  economy.  While  these  assump; 
tions  may  hold  in  long-run  equilibrium,  empirical 
evidence  suggests  that  they  may  not  hold  over 
any  realistic  current  policy-making  horizon  nor 
over  the  transitional  adjustment  period  following 
monetary  shocks.  Recognition  of  this  fact  would 
certainly  modify-perhaps  drastically-any  poh- 
cy  prescriptions  based  on  the  model.  Subject  to 
these  caveats,  the  policy  implications  of  the 
model  are  summarized  below. 
Small  Country  Implications  The  first  and  most 
radical  implication  stemming  from  the  model  is 
that,  in  the  case  of  small  open  economies  operat- 
ing  with  fixed  exchange  rates,  traditional  macro- 
economic  monetary  and  balance  of  payments  poli- 
cies  are  both  unnecessary  and  useless.  They  are 
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mechanism  works  automatically  to  correct  eco- 
nomic  disequilibria  and  to  provide  each  country 
with  sufficient  money  to  accommodate  full  ca- 
pacity  levels  of  output.  They  are  useless  because 
the  domestic  authorities  cannot  control  the 
money  supply  or  the  balance  of  payments,  both  of 
which  are  endogenous  variables  determined  by 
the  public’s  demand  for  money. 
Suppose,  for  example,  the  authorities  try  to 
improve  the  country’s  balance  of  payments  by 
devaluing  the  currency,  i.e.,  engineering  a  one- 
time  increase  in  the  pegged  exchange  rate.  This 
devaluation  has  no  permanent  impact  on  the 
trade  balance.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  a  favorable 
&or&rzin  impact,  but  this  impact  is  inherently  tran- 
sient  as  can  be  seen  by  tracing  the  sequence  of 
events  triggered  by  the  policy  action.  First,  the 
devaluation  causes  a  step  increase  in  the  ex- 
change  rate.  Given  the  foreign  price  level,  how- 
ever,  the  home  price  level  must  immediately  rise 
in  the  same  proportion  as  the  exchange  rate  to 
preserve  purchasing  power  parity.  The  domestic 
price  increase  raises  the  stock  of  cash  ,balances 
demanded  by  the  public.  This  generates  an  ex- 
cess  demand  for  money,  leading  to  a  reduction  in 
expenditure  and  to  a  trade  balance  surplus.  The 
surplus,  however,  is  short-lived,  since  it  is  accom- 
panied  by  an  inflow  of  money  that  eventually 
eliminates  the  discrepancy  between  actual  and 
desired  cash  balances.  When  this  happens,  the 
adjustment  process  ceases,  domestic  spending 
again  equals  production,  and  the  trade  baIance 
surplus  vanishes.  The  sole  long-run  effect  of  the 
devaluation  is  on  the  price  level  which,  according 
to  the  demand  for  money  equation,  rises  in  exact 
proportion  to  the  increase.in  the  domestic  money 
supply.  Within  the  context  of  the  example,  the 
authorities  are  powerless  to  exercise  permanent 
control  over  the  balance  of  payments. 
The  only  thing  the  monetary  authorities  can 
controI  in  a  small  open  economy  is  the  cowposition 
of  the  money  .supply,  i.e.,  the  mix  between  do- 
mestic  credit  and  international  reserves.  They 
cannot,  however,  govern  the  size  or  total  quantity 
of  the  money  supply.  For  according  to  the  mone- 
tary  theory  of  the  balance  of  payments,  an  expan- 
sion  in  the  controllable  domestic  credit  compo- 
nent  of  the  money  stock  will  result  in  a  balance  of 
payments  deficit  and  an  outflow  of  the  uncon- 
trollable  international  reserve  component  until 
the  money  stock  returns  to  its  initial  level.  When 
equilibrium  is  restored,  the  mix  of  the.  money 
stock  will  be  changed-domestic  credit  having 
displaced  international  reserves  dollar  for  dollar 
-but  the  total  will  be  unaltered.  This  conclusion 
follows  directly  from  the  model  as  can  be  seen 
by  setting  the  money  supply  equation  equal  to  the 
money  demand  equation  to  yield  C  +  R  =  KPY. 
Given  the  long-run  equilibrium  values  of  the 
variables  on  the  right-hand  side  of  this  equation, 
it  follows  that  any  change  in  the  domestic  credit 
component  C  must  be  offset  by  a  change  identical 
in  size  but  opposite  in  sign  in  the  international 
reserve  component  R  to  keep  the  total  money 
stock  equal  to  the  unchanged  steady-state  de- 
mand  for  it.  In  short,  the  total  ‘stock  of  money  is 
no  more  a  controllable  variable  than  is  the  bal- 
ance  of  payments  in  a  small  open  economy. 
A  second  policy  implication  is  that,  assuming 
the  absence  of  monetary  contraction  abroad,  a 
nation’s  monetary  authorities  are  solely  to  blame 
for  ‘its  balance  of  payments  deficits,  since  there 
can  be  no  deficits  unless  there  is  an  excess  supply 
of  money.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  such. 
deficits  are  inherently  transitory  phenomena.  For 
the  model  predicts  that  they  will  vanish  as  soon 
as  the  redundant  money  is  diffused  throughour 
the  world  economy  by  the  operation  of  the  inter- 
national  adjustment  mechanism. 
A  third  policy  implication  is  that,  in  a  world  of 
fixed  exchange  rates,  a  small  open  economy  can 
control  neither  its  price  level  nor  its  rate  of  inila.- 
tion,  since  both  are  determined  in  world  markets. 
This  means  that  an  individua1  country  will  find  it 
impossible  to  avoid  inflating  at  the  world  rate.  It 
also  means  that  in  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system 
all  national  inflation  rates  must  eventually  con- 
verge.  This  latter  conclusion  can  be  demon- 
strated  by  taking  the  time  derivative  of  the  loga- 
rithm  of  the  purchasing  power  parity  equation. 
This  operation  yields  the  result  p  =  s  +  p* 
?+here  p  an’d  p*  are  the  percentage  rates  of  price 
iniIation  in  the  ‘home  and  foreign  countryt  re- 
spectively,  and  x  is  the  percentage  rate  of  change 
of  the  exchange  rate.  This  result  states  that  rates 
of  inflation  in  the  home  country  and  the  rest  of 
the  world  can  differ  only  by  the  proportional  rate 
of  change  of  the  exchange  rate.  In  a  system  of 
fixed  exchange  rates,  however,  the  latter  variable 
is  zero  and  therefore  the  two  inflation  rates 
must  .converge.  In  short,  with  fixed  exchange 
rates,  countries  cannot  continually  infiate  at  dii- 
ferent  rates. 
A  fourth  policy  implication,  therefore,  is  that 
if  a  country  wishes  to  choose  its  own  inflation 
rate  independent  of  the  rest  of  the  world  it 
must  operate  with  a  flexible  exchange  rate.  By 
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trol  over  its  money  supply  and  hence  its  rate  of 
inflation.  The  logic  behind  this  conclusion  is 
straightforward.  Floating  exchange  rates  operate 
to  maintain  continuous  equilibrium  in  a  country’s 
external  accounts,  thereby  obviating  the  need  for 
international  money  flows.  It  follows,  therefore, 
that  increases  in  the  domestic  money  stock,  in- 
stead  of  being  diffused  abroad  through  the  bal- 
ance  of  payments,  will  remain  at  home  to  induce 
equiproportional  rises  in  the  domestic  price  level. 
Note  that  the  adjustment  mechanism  in  the  float- 
ing  rate  case  differs  markedly  from  that  of  a fixed 
rate  regime.  In  the  latter,  money  market  equilib- 
rium  is  restored  by  quantity  adjustments,  namely, 
international  flows  of  money.  In  the  former  case. 
however,  stock  equilibrium  is  restored  by  price  ad- 
justments,  namely,  changes  in  the  domestic  price 
levels.  To  summarize,  with  the  exchange  rate 
floating  so  as  to  equilibrate  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments,  a  nation’s  money  stock  becomes  an  exog- 
enous  variable  which  the  authorities  can  control 
to  achieve  any  rate  of  inflation  they  desire. 
If  a  floating  exchange  rate  permits  a  country 
to  determine  its  own  rate  of  inflation,  then  it  also 
insulates  that  country  from  inflation  originating 
abroad.  Thus  when  a  foreign  nation  inflates  its 
money  supply  while  the  home  country  holds  its 
currency  constant,  the  resulting  rise  in  the  for- 
eign  price  level  will  be  offset  by  an  equipropor- 
tional  fall  in  the  exchange  rate,  leaving  domestic 
prices  unchanged.  Xote,  however,  that  this  con- 
clusion  has  an  important  corollary,  namely,  that 
under  a  flexible  exchange  rate  a  country  must 
suffer  the  full  consequences  of  its  inflationary 
policies  since  it  cannot  export  its  inflation  abroad. 
It  would  be  wrong  to  conclude  from  the  above 
arguments  that  monetarists  believe  that  flexible 
exchange  rates  are  inherently  superior  to  fixed 
rates.  On  the  contrary,  many  monetarists  are 
opposed  to  floatin,  m rates  for  at  least  two  reasons. 
First,  floating  rates  eliminate  the  risk-pooling 
and  efficiency  advantages  of  international  money 
associated  with  fixed  rates.  Second,  volatile  ex- 
change  rates  between  currencies  would  tend  to 
reduce  the  effectiveness  of  money  as  a  social 
institution  for  economizing  on  the  use  of  scarce 
resources  in  the  production  and  dissemination  of 
economic  information. 
It  is  on  the  basis  of  such  arguments  that  some 
monetarists-e.g.,  Robert  A.  Mundell  and  Arthur 
Laffer-urge  the  restoration  of  a  system  of  fixed 
exchange  rates,  with  the  rate  of  world  monetary 
expansion  being  regulated  by  a  world  central 
bank.  By  contrast,  other  monetarists  such  as 
5lilton  Friedman,  Harry  G.  Johnson,  and  David 
Laidler,  while  agreeing  that  volatile  exchange 
rates  introduce  risk  and  inefficiency  into  the  inter- 
national  economy,  do  not  believe  that  a  regime  of 
institutionally  fixed  exchange  rates  is  necessarily 
the  best  solution.  According  to  these  latter  mone- 
tarists,  floating  rate  volatility  stems  from  do- 
mestic  monerary  policies  that  are  erratic,  variable, 
and  divergent  as  between  countries.  This  vola- 
tility,  it  is  claimed,  would  be  eliminated  if  all 
countries  abandoned  discretionary  countercyclical 
monetary  management  for  fixed  monetary  rules. 
The  adoption  of  rules  calling  for  a  constant  rate 
of  domestic  monetary  expansion  equal  to  the 
trend  growth  rate  of  real  output  supposedly 
would  make  the  flexible  rate  virtually  as  stable 
as  a  rigidly  fixed  rate.  Moreover,  flexible  rates 
have  the  added  advantage  of  being  determined  by 
market  forces,  thus  freeing  governments  to  use 
their  policy  instruments  in  pursuit  of  purely 
domestic  objectives. 
It  is  apparent  from  the  above  that  while  mone- 
tarists  agree  that  exchange  rate  stability  is  neces- 
sary  for  an  efficiently  operating  international 
economy,  they  disagree  on  the  question  of  the 
most  appropriate  exchange  rate  regime.  This 
disagreement  is  not  as  important  as  it  appears, 
however,  since  all  monetarists  acknowledge  that 
the  key  to  exchange  rate  stability  lies  less  in  the 
way  the  foreign  exchange  market  is  organized 
than  in  finding  a  means  of  coordinating  national 
monetary  policies.  True,  the  policy  coordination 
problem  has  not  been  solved,  although  many 
solutions  have  been  proposed  (including  the 
above-mentioned  proposals  of  rules  and  a  world 
central  bankj.  But  if  and  when  it  is  solved,  the 
exchange  rate-whether  fixed  or  floating-will 
be  stable.  And  once  the  exchange  rate  is  stabi- 
lized,  inflation  will  again  be  an  international 
rather  than  a  national  problem.  This  is  because  a 
stable  rate  oi  exchange  between  national  curren- 
cies  makes  the  sum  of  those  currencies  an  eco- 
nomically  relevant  aggregate  and  also  implies 
that  national  inflation  rates  will  converge  on  a 
common  (world)  level. 
Large  Country  Implications  The  policy  implica- 
tions  discussed  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  refer 
to  small  open  economies.  As  pointed  out  earlier, 
however,  the  implications  are  substantially  differ- 
ent  when  the  individual  country  is  large  relative 
to  the  rest  of  <he  world.  The  main  difference  con- 
cerns  the  ability  of  a  country  to  control  its  own 
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rates.  As  noted  earlier,  in  a  fixed  rate  regime  an 
individual  country’s  domestic  monetary  expan- 
sion  will  affect  its  price  level  only  indirectly  by 
influencing  the  world  money  supply  and  the 
world  price  level.  The  strength  of  this  influence 
is  in  direct  proportion  to  the  relative  economic 
size  of  the  country  as  measured  by  its  share  of 
the  world  money  supply.  For  an  individual  small 
country  this  share  is  negligible  and  therefore  so 
is  the  country’s  ability  to  influence  its  own  price 
level.  In  sharp  contrast,  a  large  country’s  money 
stock  forms  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  world 
money  stock  such  that  an  expansion  in  the  former 
stock  will  result  in  a  significant  expansion  in  the 
latter  and,  therefore,  in  the  world  and  national 
price  levels.  Because  of  its  size,  the  large  country 
is  able  to  indirectly  regulate  its  own  money  stock 
and  price  level  even  in  a  world  of  fixed  exchange 
rates.  In  this  sense,  a  large  country’s  money 
stock  becomes  an  exogenous  variable  and  its  price 
level  an  endogenous  one,  which  is  just  the  reverse 
of  the  case  for  small  countries. 
Apart  from  sheer  size,  there  is  a  second  reason 
why  a  large  country  may  be  able  to  control  its 
money  supply  even  in  a  fixed  rate  regime.  The 
country  may  be  a  reserve  curresc_v  country,  i.e.,  one 
whose  currency  is  held  by  other  countries  as  a 
form  of  international  reserves.  As  previously 
mentioned,  in  a  fixed  rate  world  with  no  reserve 
currency  country,  nations  can  control  the  compo- 
sition  but  not  the  quantity  of  their  individual 
money  stocks.  According  to  the  monetary  theory 
of  the  balance  of  payments,  an  expansion  in  the 
controllable  domestic  credit  component  of  a  na- 
tion’s  money  stock  will  result  in  a  balance  of 
payments  deficit  and  an  outflow  of  the  uncon- 
trollable  international  reserve  component  until 
the  money  stock  returns  to  its  initial  level. 
In  the  case  of  a  reserve  currency  country, 
however,  an  expansion  in  the  domestic  credit 
portion  of  the  money  supply  need  not  lead  to  an 
offsetting  contraction  in  the  international  reserve 
component  if  the  rest  of  the  world  holds  its  in- 
creased  reserves  in  the  form  of  government  se- 
curities  issued  by  the  reserve  currency  country. 
Although  the  country  runs  a balance  of  payments 
deficit  as  a result  of  its  domestic  monetary  expan- 
sion,  its  status  as  a  reserve  currency  country 
enables  it  to  effectively  neutralize  the  impact  of 
the  payments  deficit  on  its  money  supply.  Thus 
despite  the  deficit,  the  authority  is  able  to  achieve 
an  expansion  of  the  money  supply.  -4pparentlJ 
such  was  the  case  in  the  late  1960’s  and  early 
1970’s  when  the  reserve  currency  status  of  the 
dollar  enabled  the  U.  S.  to  expand  its  money 
stock  in  the  face  of  large  external  deficits.  This 
latter  experience  indicates  that  the  reserve  cur- 
rency  case  constitutes  an  important  exception  to 
the  monetarist  prediction  that  payments  deficits 
tend  to  be  accompanied  by  reductions  in  the  na- 
tion’s  money  stock. 
Summary  This  article  has  expounded  the  global 
monetarist  explanation  of  inflation  within  the 
framework  of  a  simple  two-country  model  that 
links  national  price  levels,  money  stocks,  money 
flows,  spending,  and  the  balance  of  payments. 
The  model  can  account  for  the  generation  of 
world  inflation  under  fixed  exchange  rates,  for 
the  transmission  of  that  inflation  to  individual 
national  economies,  and  for  the  distribution  of 
world  money  necessary  to  support  it  in  each 
nation.  Typically  monetarist,  the  model  stresses 
the  role  of  the  demand  for  money  in  determining 
both  the  steady-state  path  of  world  prices  and 
the  dynamic  adjustment  to  that  path.  The  model 
also  yields  the  standard  predictions  of  the  quan- 
tity  theory,  namely  equiproportionality  of  money 
and  prices,  long-run  neutrality  of  money,  and  the 
equilibrium  international  distribution  of  money. 
Moreover,  it  embodies  the  global  monetarist  con- 
ception  of  the  international  economy  as  a  stable 
self-regulating  mechanism  in  which  monetary 
and  payments  disequilibria  are  inherently  transi- 
tory  phenomena.  Finally,  the  model  provides  a 
iramework  for  stating  cleariy  the  macroeconomic 
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